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In evaluating the possibility of admissibility in each particular case,'
there are two important requirements which must not be overlooked; the
proponent of the evidence has the burden of showing that the declaration was in fact against interest, 81 and that the declarant believed it to
be against his interest ;32 both are necessary because, for example, should
the interest of the declarant be erroneously supposed by him to be served
by the statement which he is making, the latter is devoid of probative
force, although as the situation actually exists it is very much against his
pecuniary or proprietary interest. 33
In some rare case the income tax return of a third person (B)
might also be advantageously introduced against that third person's
successor in interest (A) as a "vicarious admission."8 4 The prerequisite
for the introduction of such evidence is a showing of privity between
A and B as successive holders of a title,36 that B made -the statement
while he was holder of the title, and that it could have been used against
B in litigation over his title.8 6 Contrary to the requirements of a "declaration against interest," here there is no need of a showing that the
declarant is dead, or that the declaration was against interest ;3T however,
such an admission is competent only against the successor in interest,
38
and not in his favor.
Civil cases involving the use of income tax returns as evidence seem
to be extremely limited in number, but with the requirement of tax
returns from practically everyone in the United States today, their
statements of their financial positions are thus opened to the possibility
of scrutiny; and it is not improbable that income tax returns will come
into use as evidence more and more.
WALTER E. BROCK, JR.
Insu'auce-Fraud and Materiality of RepresentationsStatutory Construction
The recent case of Carroll v. Carolina Casualty Ivs. Co.' serves to
illustrate the relatively confused interpretations that are found to exist

with respect to the short but sweeping North Carolina insurance statute2
See note 28 supra.
' 2 See note 28 supra.
"Roe v. Journegan, 175 N. C. 261 at 265, 95 S. E. 495 (1918) (quoting with
approval from 2 CHAMBLAYNE ON EVIDENCE §2782 [1913]).
" For discussion of "admissions by predecessors in interest," see STANSBURY,
op. cit. =pra,note 3, §174.
" Satterwhite v. Hicks, 44 N. C. 105 (1852); Guy v. Hall, 7 N. C. 150
(1819).
'* WIMORE, EVIDENCE §1081 (3rd ed. 1940); STANSBURY, Op. cit. supra, note
3, §174, and cases there cited.
"' STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note 3, §174.
3

.'Roberts v. Roberts, 82 N. C. 29 (1880).

1227 N. C. 456, 42 S. E. 2d 607 (1947).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §58-30. *
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which provides that "all statements ... in any application for insurance,
or in the policy itself, shall be deemed representations and not warranties, and... unless material or fraudulent, will not prevent a recovery
on the policy."
It should be noted particularly that this statute applies to all statements and to all types of insurance. Other states have somewhat similar
statutes but most are limited to a particular form of insurance or to
the application or negotiation only.3
The statute would appear to be unambiguous but the cases interpreting it do not appear unanimous in two respects at least. The first
problem has to do with the test to be used in determining the materiality
of a statement made by an applicant and the second concerns the necessity of finding fraud on the part of the applicant in the event the
statement is untrue.
The application of the statute to other circumstances raises additional
problems of interest, but they are beyond the scope of this note, its purpose being only to investigate the position of the North Carolina Su4
preme Court as to the above two points.
In the principal case the applicant for hospital insurance, in answer
to a specific question on the point, incorrectly asserted that his wife did
not have hernia. The feme plaintiff was later hospitalized for an
appendectomy and the hernia was incidentally repaired at the same time,
but there was no evidence that the hernia was a contributing factor to
the initial hospitalization.. The defendant insurer refused payment of
the hospital expenses on the ground that the untrue statement was of
such importance that had the truth been known the policy would not
have been issued.
The jury determined that the statement by the insured was not made
with intent to deceive and that it did not materially affect acceptance of
the risk by the insurer. Recovery was, therefore, allowed. On appeal,
the verdict for plaintiff was not disturbed.
In searching for a test for determining the materiality of a representation the North Carolina Supreme Court has used several approaches,
and the divergence of the theories is sometimes noticeably apparent. In
the principal case the court says, "the general rule is that the materiality
of the representation depends on whether it was such as would naturally
and reasonably have influented the insurance company with respect to
PArTmsoN, ESsENTIALS OF INSuRAKCE LAW §§72-74 (1st ed. 1935) ; 26 states
have similar statutes applying to life, accident, or health -insurance. North Carolina one of fewv extending this to all types.
'Effect on continuing warranties, conditions precedent, concealment, etc. See
PArrsoN, op. cit. supra, note 3, §72, for seven basic factors to be considered in
determing the applicability and scope of this type statute.
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the contract or risk." Numerous decisions have used similar language
in describing the test sought for.5
The rule as stated raises considerable doubt as to whether an objective or a subjective test is intended. The classic phrase "naturally
and reasonably" suggests an objective standard, of course. This would
be in agreement with most jurisdictions which have enacted statutes
directed toward similar ends.6 But some doubt is cast on this conclusion
by the next phrase pertaining to influencing "the insurance company,"
which would seem to indicate that perhaps a subjective test is intended,
i.e., would this particular insurance company have accepted the risk had
the true facts been known at the time. 7 This interpretation is further
strengthened by statements explaining similar definitions in other cases,
as in Schas v. Equitable Life Ins. Co.8 where it was said that the misrepresentation need not have contributed to the loss or damage suffered,
but whether or not it was material depends upon whether the applicant's
answer "would have influenced the company in deciding for itself, and
in its own interest, the important question of accepting the risk, and
what rate of premium should be charged." Such explanations suggest
that the practices of the particular company may be the determining
factors to be considered by North Carolina juries.9
A somewhat different approach to the problem of materiality is frequently noticed in the innumerable cases interpreting and applying this
statute. It is found in the North Carolina decisions as well as in those
of the federal courts, apparently originating in its present form in this
state in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leaksville Woolen Mills' ° and seems
to have been appropriated from the Supreme Court of the United
States." The test as laid down in the Leaksville case and subsequently
rE.g., Wells v. Jefferson Stand. Life Ins. Co., 211 N. C. 427, 429, 190 S. E.
744, 745 (1937); Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Box Co., 185 N. C. 543, 546, 117
S. E. 785, 786 (1923) ; Schas v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 166 N. C. 55, 58, 81 S. E.
1014, 1015 (1914) ; Alexander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 150 N. C. 536, 538,
64 S. E. 432, 433 (1909) ; Bryant v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 N. C. 181,
184, 60 S.E. 983, 985 (1908) ; Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C. 589, 593, 53 S.E.

354, 356 (1906).
' The text writers do not seem to advocate any particular form of test. See
VANcE, INSURA cE §382 (2d ed. 1930) describing the test in words similar to
those used by the court in the principal case; PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW §82 (1st ed. 1935) suggesting what appears to be a hybrid test, as,
"the fairest solution ... maintain individual standard as the ultimate test, allowing
the insurer to produce proof of its own standard and claimant to refute . . . by
... proof of practices of other insurers ... for showing ... this insurer arbitrary
and exceptional."
'If the standard enunciated in the charge was truly subjective, the court, on
appeal, even though it preferred an objective test for materiality, might be disinclined to disapprove, since a subjective standard is most favorable to the insurer
and thus cannot be said to be prejudicial to him.
8166 N. C. 55, 81 S. E. 1014 (1914).
o Particularly is this indicated by opinions which approve charges capitalizing
the words, as, "The Insurance Company."
10172 N. C. 534, 90 S. E. 574 (196).
" Jeffries v. Economical Life Ins. Co., 22 Wall. 47 (U. S. 1875).
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approved many times is essentially subjective and is to the effect that
the determination of the materiality of representations is not always
open to dispute and that it is only necessary to look to the policy or to
the application for the answer, for when the representation is in the
form of a written answer to a written question it is deemed to be made
material by the acts of the parties to the contract. In other words,
the mere fact that the question was asked by the insurer and answered
by the insured is said to be a conclusive indication of materiality.12 The
answer then must be true or recovery will be denied. In these cases
materiality is found by the court as a matter of law, the only thing
remaining for the jury to determine is whether the statement was false.
At first glance, this approach, which may be termed the "written
question-written answer: therefore material" doctrine, would seem to
be a considerable departure from the rule of the principal case. Indeed,
if carried to its logical conclusion an opposite result would be warranted
in the principal case. However, an analysis of the various cases using
this approach shows that, although the court supports its conclusion by
reference to the "written question-written answer" doctrine, the facts are
of such a nature that the result would be the same by the objective,
subjective, or any other reasonable standard.' 3 Reasonable men could
not differ on the question. It therefore seems unnecessary to fear that
any such sweeping rule will ever be adopted to apply to any and all statements made by the insured, else insurance law in this state would be
reverting to the mechafiical standards applied by the common law. The
North Carolina Supreme Court is not unaware of the purpose of the
" In effect, such an approach seems to defeat the purpose of the statute completely, for, instead of all statements becoming representations, the reverse is made
the result and all statements assume the legal effect of common law warranties
merely because the insurer chose to demand a written answer to a written question.

The Jeffries case, supra note 11, would appear to be poor authority for the proposition since no comparable statute was involved there and the court merely applied
the common law rule of warranties, which is the very rule intended to be abrogated by N. C. GmN. STAT. (1943) §58-30. See Note, 131 A. L. R. 617, 625
(1941).

"E.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leaksville Woolen Mills, 172 N. C. 534, 90
S. E. 574 (1916) (applicant stated "no operation since childhood" when actually
he had undergone several of a serious nature) ; Petty v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 212 N. C. 157, 193 S. E. 228 (1937) (declaration of good health, but actually
under treatment for duodenal ulcer from which he later died) ; Washington Life
Ins. Co. v. Box Co., 185 N. C. 543, 117 S.E. 785 (1923) (knowingly denied any
spitting of blood, but later died of tuberculosis) ; Alexander v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 150 N. C. 536, 64 S. E. 432 (1909) (untrue assertion that applicant
was not under treatment for a kidney disease) ; Bryant v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 147 N. C. 181, 60 S.E. 983 (1908) (denial of physician's care for two preceding years, although being treated for consumption) ; Jeffress v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 74 F. 2d 874 (C. C. A. 4th 1935) (non-disclosure of treatment for hookworm and secondary anemia); Dudgeon v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n,
70 F. 2d 49 (C. C. A. 4th 1934) (claim of temperate habits and no prior refusal
of insurance, the reverse being true) ; Fountain & Herrington, Inc. v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 55 F. 2d 120 (C. C. A. 4th 1932) (claim of good health although recently
advised of necessity for appendectomy).
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This conclusion is borne out by another group of cases where,

although written answers are given to written questions, the court rules
as a matter of law that the statements are immaterial. Here also,
reasonable men could not differ on the inferences from the facts concerned, as an analysis of each case will show.',
It can therefore be said that our court is somewhere near the middle
of the road, treating the question of materiality as any other question
of fact, or mixed law and fact; submitting it to the jury when doubtful,
otherwise ruling it material or immaterial as a matter of law,' 6 even
though sometimes utilizing the anomalous "written question-written
answer" doctrine. Although, as pointed out above, when the issue of
materiality is left to the jury the standard to be applied is doubtful, the
tenor of, the decisions seems to indicate that the court, in furthering
the purpose of the statute, would approve an objective standard when
materiality depends upon some practice peculiar to the particular insurer.
As to the necessity of finding fraud on the part of the applicant, the
statute clearly says that to prevent a recovery, the misrepresentation
must be "material or fraudulent" and this plain meaning is generally
followed by the court, to the extent of holding that if materiality is
found no fraud need be present. Typical of this is Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Ashby 7 where it is said that "if the representation
is false it need not be fraudulently made to invalidate the policy ...
The misrepresentation of a material fact . . . avoids the policy even
though the assured be innocent of an intent to wrongfully induce the
assurer to act. ..."
No recent case has been found where a fraudulent immaterial representation alone has been sufficient to prevent recovery on the policy. It
is submitted that this is as it should be, for the purpose of the statute
would seem to be to relieve the harshness of the common law doctrine
which was uncompromising in its demand for literal compliance with all
warranties in insurance policies.' 8 Yet by the use of the word "or" in
the statute, it would appear that even an immaterial misrepresentation,
if fraudulently made, would be fatal to the rights of the insured. This
" Cottingham v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 168 N. C. 259, 261, 84 S. E.
274, 275 (1915) ("prevent insurance companies from escaping the payment of
honest losses upon technicalities and strict construction of contracts").
"E.g., Wells v. Jefferson Stand. Life Ins. Co., 211 N. C. 427, 190 S. E. 744
(1937) (non-disclosure of temporary indisposition); Anthony v. Teachers' Protective Union, 206 N. C. 7, 173 S.E. 6 (1934) (failure to disclose treatment of
temporary disorder, but revealing treatment of more serious nature) ; Howell v.
American National Ins. Co., 189 N. C. 212, 126 S. E. 603 (1925) (false statement that beneficiary was applicant's daughter).
" Howell v. American National Ins. Co., 189 N. C. 212, 214, 126 S. E. 603,
605 17215
(1925).N. C. 280,
1 S.E. 2d 830 (1939).
1 See note 14 supra.
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would prejudice the insured more than would the common law rule. 19
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in a case 20 construing a similar statute,21
decides that surely the legislature did not intend to vnake the insurer's
liability any less.
For all practical purposes then, the words, "or fraudulent," can be
considered surplusage. Yet in one recent case 2 our court, in its effort
to equalize the relative positions of insurer and insured, appears to have
interpreted this statute as requiring the insurer to prove fraud on the
part of the applicant, even though the misrepresentation was clearly
material to the risk, contributed to the loss, and induced the insurer to
undertake a risk otherwise unacceptable. In this action to cancel the policy the court referred to N. C. GEx. STAT. (1943) §58-30, seized upon the
lack of fraud, and refused to allow a cancellation. At first glance this
decision would appear to give some meaning to the word "fraudulent"
in the statute, for a literal interpretation would indicate that the misrepresentation must be both material and fraudulent rather than material or fraudulent, but it should be pointed out that the decision was not
rested solely upon the statute in question. Reliance also was placed
upon a companion statute2 which bars relief, in the absence of fraud,
when no physical examination is required. The peculiar circumstances
of the case 24 and the applicability of this companion statute probably
explain the apparent reliance on the word "fraudulent" and indicates
that the departure from the usual interpretation of the statute is less
real than apparent. At any rate, this approach should not be unduly extended for such a position not only flaunts the plain wording of the
statute, but fortifies the position of the insured to such an extent that a
recovery on a policy would seldom be refused, for most untrue statements are inadvertant rather than fraudulent. The scales would be
tipped too far in favor of the insured, who, under the common law, was
in much the weaker position.
The North Carolina statute can thus be said to affect the common
law as little as any comparable enactment. In short, the net effect is
only to convert statements which by the common law might have been
called warranties (and thereby subject to rigid compliance), into repre1

VANCE, IxSuRANcE §395, n. 78 (2d ed. 1930) ("Most common law decisions
under the doctrine of representations refused to avoid a policy for any immaterial
misrepresentations.").
20

Johnson v. National Life Ins. Co., 123 Minn. 453, 457, 144 N. W. 218, 220

(1913).
21 MINN. GEN. STAT. (1913)
§3300.
22 Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 208 N. C. 22, 179 S. E. 2 (1935).
"N. C. GEzN. STAT. (1943)

§58-200.

Applicant consulted many doctors because of dizziness some years prior to
issuance of policy. Diagnosis of disease was creeping paralysis which was incurable so doctors decided not to inform applicant who thus stated "no diseases
last 10 years" and failed to disclose fact of consultation.
24
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sentations. The common law of representations remains relatively unchanged. Materiality of representations has always been a prerequisite
for cancellation of a policy of insurance or for prevention of recovery
by the insured. Fraudulent, but immaterial, representations have never
been considered by the common law, or under modem statutes, as warranting an avoidance of a policy of insurance. Further relaxation of
the common law, then, must come in the standard selected and applied
by the court for determining the materiality of the incorrect statement
being contested. The "written question-written pmswer" doctrine certainly will do nothing toward furthering the purpose of the statute and
it is hoped that this proposition will not again be heard, but that the
North Carolina Supreme Court will in the future adopt some form of
objective standard.
JOSEPH C. MooRE, JR.
Judgments-Opening Default Judgment for Neglect of AttorneyDiscretionary Power in Trial Judge
The plaintiff sued in claim and delivery for the recovery of an automobile and had judgment by default for want of an answer. When
execution issued defendant appeared and moved that the judgment be
set aside for excusable neglect. The clerk allowed the motion and the
plaintiff appealed to the judge of the superior court who affirmed the
order vacating the judgment upon the following findings of fact: summons was duly served on defendant together with an order extending
the time to file complaint (G. S. §1-121) whereupon she employed an
attorney who mistakenly advised her that the plaintiff could not proceed until additional papers were served on her, and that he would
request the clerk to notify him of the filing of the complaint, and
would inform her when it became necessary for her to answer; the
attorney then became seriously ill and was unable to attend to the duties
of his office, as a result of which no further action was taken and the
default judgment was entered; the defendant was unacquainted with
court procedure and had not herself been negligent; she had a meritorious defense to the cause as an innocent purchaser for value. The
Superior Court ruled, therefore, that the default was occasioned by the
negligence of the attorney and that the same was not imputable to the
defendant who was without fault. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme
Court. Held- order vacating the judgment affirmed.' Since the failure
to answer was not wholly due to the attorney's erroneous belief that
additional papers2 would have to be served on the defendant, the major'Rierson v. York, 227 N. C. 575, 42 S. E. 2d 902 (1947).
The complaint. Record, p. 22.

